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USURY-APPLYING STATE USURY PENALTY TO A NATIONAL
BANK WHEN IT IS THE ASSIGNEE OF A CONDITIONAL SALES
CONTRAcT-Robertson v. Burnett, Hills v. Burnett (Neb.
1961).
Companion cases,' decided in June 1961 by the Nebraska
Supreme Court, were essentially similar with respect to their
factual situations. In each, a buyer and a seller contracted for the
sale of a house trailer, the transaction consisting of the signing of
a promissory note by the buyer in accordance with a conditional
sales contract, and a subsequent assignment of the note, by the
seller, to a national bank located in Michigan. The certificate of
title, which was in the name of the buyer, noted a lien by the
national bank, and was at all times in the possession of the bank
after the assignment of the note. A payment book was issued
by the bank to the buyer, and he made all installment payments
directly to the bank.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the
trial court, held that the transaction was a usurious installment
loan rather than a valid time sale. Pursuant to the Nebraska In-
stallment Loan Act,2 the bank was ordered to deliver a clear title
to the buyer, together with a remittance of payments of principal
and interest previously made.3 The position taken by the bank
was that the federal penalty provision for usury in the National
Banking Act preempted the state penalty. 4 The court held contra,
1 Robertson v. Burnett, 172 Neb. 385, 109 N.W.2d 716 (1961), and Hills
v. Burnett, 172 Neb. 370, 109 N.W.2d 739 (1961).
2 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 45-114 to -158 (Reissue 1960), hereafter referred to
as the Installment Loan Act.
8 On other issues the court held that the bank was subject to statutory
service applicable to "foreign corporations," and that there was proper
venue. The Nebraska court's holding on this latter question has been
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Michigan Nat'l
Bank v. Robertson, petition for cert. filed, 30 U.S.L. Week 3235 (U.S.
January 23, 1962) (No. 628); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Hills, petition for
cert. filed, 30 U.S.L. Week 3242 (U.S. January 30, 1962) (No. 669).
4 13 Stat. 108 (1864), 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1959) "The taking, receiving, re-
serving, or charging a rate of interest greater than is allowed by the
preceding section, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture
of the entire interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt
carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. In case
the greater rate of interest has been paid, the person by whom it has
been paid, or his legal representatives, may recover back, in an action
in the nature of an action of debt, twice the amount of interest thus
paid from the association taking or receiving the same: Provided, That
NOTES
however; its rationale being that the transaction consisted of a
usurious loan from the seller to the buyer, void from its inception.
The fact that there was a subsequent assignment to the bank did
not "breathe life back into the void instrument."5 In other words,
the court felt that the financial arrangements comprised two sep-
arate and independent transactions, resulting in the bank being
the assignee recipient of a void note.0
The National Banking Act of 1864 incorporates the state in-
terest rates for loans into the federal usury provisions.7 A na-
tional bank must abide by the individual state usury laws, there-
fore, when charging interest on loans, discounts, notes or other
indebtedness. The act further provides, however, that the "taking,
receiving, reserving or charging" of a usurious rate of interest by
a national bank will result in a forfeiture of the interest due, plus
a remittance of twice the interest paid.8 The cases uniformly hold
that the federal penalty will preempt any state penalty when a
national bank engages in usurious practices.9
As previously indicated, the Nebraska court looked upon the
financial negotiations and agreements as being two separate trans-
actions, that is, one between the seller and the buyer, and a second
between the seller and the bank. However, the contrary conclu-
sion can also be reached. This conclusion would be that rather
than two independent transactions having been involved, there
such action is commenced within two years from the time the usurious
transaction occurred."
5 Robertson v. Burnett, 172 Neb. 385, 398, 109 N.W.2d 716, 724 (1961).
6 See generally, Buetel, The Interpretation of the N.I.L. and Statutes
DecZaring Instruments Void, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 744 (1935); Comment,
40 NEB. L. REV. 433, 457 (1961).
7 13 Stat. 108 (1864), 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1959).
8 13 Stat. 108 (1864), 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1959).
9 McCollum v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 303 U.S. 245 (1938); Evans v. Na-
tional Bank of Savannah, 251 U.S. 108 (1919) (discount); National
Bank of Cloversville v. Johnson, 104 U.S. 271 (1881) (discount); Farm-
ers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29 (1875) (a leading
case); Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (8 Wall.) 409
(1873) (exceeds rate for state banks, but less than that for other fi-
nancial institutes-held, not usurious); Schumacher v. Lawrence, 108
F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1940); Panos v. Smith, 116 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1940);
First Nat'l Bank of Tobias v. Barnett, 51 Neb. 397, 70 N.W. 937 (1897);
Lantham v. First Nat'l Bank of Crete, 46 Neb. 663, 65 N.W. 786 (1896);
Norfolk Natl Bank v. Schwenk, 46 Neb. 381, 64 N.W. 1073 (1895); Rock-
land-Atlas Nat'l Bank v. Murphy, 329 Mass. 755, 110 N.E.2d 638 (1953);
National City Bank of New York v. Levine, 155 Misc. 132, 277 N.Y.
Supp. 664 (City of N.Y., Borough of Manhattan, Munic. Ct., 3d Dist.
1933).
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was, in reality, a direct loan from the bank to the buyer, in spite
of the fact that the form of the transaction will not support this
contention. Looking through the form to the substance of the
situation, a court could well conclude that there was a direct loan
from the bank to the purchaser. 10
In the situation at hand, the buyer was making payments to
the bank; a large portion" of the forms and documents used in
the transaction was printed and furnished by the bank, and the
bank held the certificate of title to the trailer. In addition, a
"'customer's statement," (a document listing credit references plus
financial assets and liabilities of the buyer) was drawn up by the
bank on its own form and signed by the purchaser. All this would
tend to lead any normal buyer to believe that his purchase was
being financed by the bank, and that the seller was merely acting
as the bank's agent in procuring the loan. It should be noted,
however, that the court has never gone so far as to make the
determination of whether or not there was, in substance, a direct
loan from the bank hinge upon what a reasonable buyer would
think.'
2
It is submitted that the bank was the actual controlling party
in financing the trailer. It is further suggested that if the original
contract between the buyer and the seller had not met the ap-
proval of the bank, the seller would probably have renegotiated
the contract with the buyer and then proceeded to deal with the
same bank, rather than attempt to conclude a discount arrange-
ment with another lending agency. This conjecture cannot be sub-
stantiated by the record, but it appears to be entirely sound in
view of existing business practices. 13  Another factor tending to
justify the above supposition, and also tending to substantiate the
10 Curtis v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 166 Neb. 815, 91 N.W.2d 19
(1958); Nelson v. General Credit Corp., 166 Neb. 770, 90 N.W.2d 799
(1958); McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1
(1957); State ex Tel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683,
77 N.W.2d 215 (1956); Powell v. Edwards, 162 Neb. 11, 75 N.W.2d 122
(1956); See generally Comment, 40 NEB. L. REv. 433 (1961) (an analysis
of Nebraska finance law with respect to the usury statutes).
11 Customer's statement, promissory note, conditional sales contract, and
statement of delivery.
12 It is suggested in 40 NEB. L. REV. 433 (1961) that any activity which goes
so far as to lead the normal buyer to the conclusion that he is borrow-
ing money from a financier should be treated as such by the court.
13 A normal business practice would be to renegotiate a contract if the
assignee of the promissory note and accompanying contract did not
approve of the arrangements. See Comment, 40 NEB. L. REV. 433 (1961)
(an analysis of Nebraska finance law with respect to the usury statutes).
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position that there was a direct loan from the bank, is the fact
that it was shown that over the years the bank had purchased
between three and four million dollars worth of paper similar to
that involved in the present cases.
Repeatedly the Nebraska court has held that it will look not
to the form of the contract, but to its substance, in ascertaining
whether a certain transaction is a valid time sale or a usurious
installment loan.14 In the Hills case the court looked directly to
the form of the transactiong in reaching its ultimate decision.
The bank took the position that if the court should hold the trans-
actions to be usurious, it must be done on the theory that there
was a direct loan from the bank, and if this were so, then the ap-
plicable penalty would be that prescribed by the National Banking
Act.15 In answering this contention the court pointed out that
the note was made payable to the seller, and thus concluded that
the usurious loan must have come from the seller.
A federal case, Daniel v. First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham,16
supports the position that there was a direct loan from the bank.
The transactions there were similar to those present in the cases
at hand17 and it was held that the actual transaction was a "cash
price accompanied by a loan or extension of credit to which the
Bank was privy throughout."' This holding was reached des-
pite the fact that an Alabama court, in applying its own case law,
could quite concievably have arrived at the conclusion that the
transaction was a valid time sale.19 The Daniel case points to
the fact that the federal courts will also look to the substance of
a transaction to determine where, in fact, the loan actually origin-
ated.
14 Nelson v. General Credit Corp., 166 Neb. 770, 90 N.W.2d 799 (1958);
McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957);
State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d
215 (1956); See generally Comment, 40 NEB. L. REv. 433 (1961).
15 13 Stat. 108 (1864), 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1959) (forfeiture of interest due
plus remittance of twice the interest paid).
16 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955), affd on rehearing, 228 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.
1956), modified, 239 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1956).
17 The forms were furnished by the bank and there was a printed assign-
ment on the back of the note. The bank showed the seller how to make
the necessary computations and the bank paid directly for the benefit
of the purchaser.
18 Daniel v. First Nat'1 Bank of Birmingham, 227 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir.
1955).
19 First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham v. Daniel, 239 F.2d 801, 802 (5th Cir.
1956).
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If, as herein contended, the transactions in the cases under
discussion were, in reality, direct loans from the bank, Farmers'
and Mechanics' Natl Bank v. Dearing20 would appear to govern
the present situation, and the National Banking Act would there-
fore preempt the Nebraska law. This would mean that the bank
would be forced to forfeit the interest due plus an amount equal
to twice the amount of interest paid, rather than forfeit both
principal and interest as the principle cases held.
21
For reasons herein expressed, it is submitted that the Nebras-
ka Supreme Court could have found the National Banking Act
provision for usury applicable to the present situation. The policy
of the court in holding the note and accompanying conditional
sales contract to be usurious is not questioned, inasmuch as the
court has many times held that it will not let a device or subter-
fuge of any nature disguise a usurious installment loan in the
form of a valid time sale.22 What is questioned, however, is the
court's conclusion that the usurious loan was between the buyer
and seller, and that the bank was the recipient of a void note and
accompanying conditional sales contract by assignment.
Fredric H. Kauffman, '64
20 91 U.S. 29 (1875); See text at note 9 supra.
22 Curtis v. Securties Acceptance Corp., 166 Neb. 815, 91 N.W.2d 19 (1958);
Nelson v. General Credit Corp., 166 Neb. 770, 90 N.W.2d 799 (1958);
McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957);
State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d
215 (1956); Powell v. Edwards, 162 Neb. 11, 75 N.W.2d 122 (1956).
